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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CO~CRETE PRODUCTS, INC.,
,, ;o STATE INSURANCE FUND,

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.

Case No. 19272

SECOND INJURY FUND AND
:':DUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Defendants/Respondents.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS
SECOND INJURY FUND &
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a Writ of Review from an order of the Industrial
~onunission

of Utah.

DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The defendants Second Injury Fund and Industrial Commission
concur in the Statement of the Disposition contained in the brief
of the plaintiff State Insurance Fund.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants respectfully request that this court affirm
the

order of the Industrial Commission of Utah.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The defendants concur in the Statement of Facts con: ced in the brief of the plaintiff State Insurance Fund.

ISSUE ON APPEAL

The issue on appeal is whether the State Insurance
Fund, the Worker's Compensation Carrier, is entitled to a
reimbursement from the defendant Second Injury Fund for
~£d1cal
~a:d

expenses and temporary total disability benefits

by the insurance carrier to the applicant Frederick

"aulus on claims filed on several industrial accidents.

ARGUMENT
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CORRECTLY APPLIED THE
UTAH \'IORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT TO HOLD THE PLAINTIFF
STATE INSURA.'\JCE FUND LIABLE AS THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER FOR ALL THE MEDICAL EXPENSES
AND TEMPORARY DISABILITY BENEFITS FOR LOSS TIME FROM
l'IORK AS A RESULT OF THE INDUSTRIAL INCIDENTS.

The plaintiff insurance company erroneously argues that
Lased upon the current August 12, 1978 industrial accident, the
rnployer's insurance carrier should be entitled to reimbursement
"rom the defendant Second Injury Fund at 7/13ths or 53.8% of
011 medical and temporary disability benefits paid by the carrier
011

che 1978 industrial injuries because the injured worker had a

-2-

pre-existing condition, although the prior incapacities of the
low back and

(L)

knee were found to be unrelated to the industr ,
1

injuries and the current industrial incapacity was !l2! sub.sta·•t
greater than i t would have been had the injured worker not

h~:

the pre-existing incapacities.
Based upon the record, the Administrative Law Judge
specifically found that the current 1978 industrial incapacity
was not made "substantially greater than" by the applicant's
pre-existing condition:
. Section 35-1-69, U. C. A., which says that the
industrial injury must "result in permanent incapaciL
which is substantially greater than he would have
·
incurred if he had not had the pre-existing incapacit·'
We cannot find in this case that the industrial injur:,
resulted in a substantially greater permanent incapac:
as a result of the pre-existing condition when a
completely different part of the body is involved and
the applicant at the time of the 1978 incident had nc
significant complaints or complications with either
his back or his knee which parts of the body had the
pre-existing problems noted by Dr. Holbrook. The reel.
Supreme Court case of USF&G v. Anderton, dated Januar;
1983 breathed a new life into the "substantially great•
provision making it again a viable principal."
Emphasis Added.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, page six, dated
February 7, 1983

(R. 215).

In the above entitled matter, the Industrial Commissio~.:
Utah has ruled that since the applicant's medical expenses and
temporary disability benefits arose from the 1978 industrial e•:s··
the payment of such benefits was the exclusive responsibility o~·
employer or its insurance carrier, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.'
Sections 35-1-45,

69 and 81.

The position taken by the Commisc'
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is that before the plaintiff insurance carrier is entitled to
11 ,;·

reimbursement against the defendant Second Injury Fund under

'tJh Code Ann.,

Section 35-1-69 for benefits paid to the injured

,,rkcr on said accidents,

the compensation insurance carrier is

,cguLred to show that the pre-existing incapacities made the
"iustrial injuries "substantially greater than" they would have
been "but for" the previous incapacities.
11uir, 669 P.2d 440

(Utah 1983).

See also.

Industrial Corrunission, 657 P.2d 764

Day's Market Inc. v.

u. s.

(Utah 1983);

F.

&

G.

v.

Kincheloe v.

Coca-cola Bottlino Co. of Ogden, 656 P.2d 440 (Utah 1982).
This Court has set forth the test for involving the
defendant Second Injury Fund under Section 69 as follows:
"Explicit statutory authority exists to apportion
compensation awards and medical costs between employers
and the Second Injury Fund, provided pertinent conditions
are met.
Basically, those conditions are three in
number:
1)
permanent incapacity occasioned by accidental injury, disease or congenital causes, followed by
2)
subsequent (industrial) injury resulting in further
permanent incapacity which is 3)
substantially greater
than that which would have been incurred had there been
no pre-existing incapacity. . . The Corrunission is
statutorily obligated to determine whether the subsequent
injuries sustained .
. have resulted in further
permanent incapacity which is substantially greater.
Emphasis Added.
l. S. F.

&

G.

v.

Industrial Commission, supra.

This Court conclusively resolved the issue of "substanially
1reater than" in Day's Market, Inc. v. Muir, supra.
t~,e

In Day's Market

Commission denied the insurance carrier reimbursement under
tion 69 because the carrier had failed to show that the pre-exis•ing
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incapacity had the "effect" of substantially increasing the
current industrial injury.

The Court held:

(Second Injury) Fund's only application is when, lLc
current incapacity is substantially greater . . .
this language requires a finding as to the effect 1
pre-existing incapacity has upon the current incap~c _1
Findings in the abstract as to the total pre-existin 1
incapacity are of little assistance in making this
determination, since the full responsiblity falls uccthe current employer (or carrier) unless it can be s~;·c
that the current incapacity is substantially greater
than it would have been "but for" the pre-existing
incapacity.
Da~'s

Market,

Inc. v. Muir,

669 P.2d 440(Utah 1983).

This ruling requires a finding that the subsequent
industrial injury was made substantially greater by the Fre-e:-::s:.
incapacity.

In u. S. F.

&

G. and Day's Market the Commission

denied the worker's compensation insurance carrier any reimburse·
ment from the defendant on the basis that the pre-existing condL
did not make the industrial injuries substantially greater than
they would have been otherwise.

Very simply, the Commission

denied reimbursement to the carriers because all of the rnedica'.
and temporary disability benefits resulted from the industrial
accidents only, which were the sole responsibility of the empic, 0
insurance carrier.
This same logic applies in the instant case on the gro•Jc:
that the applicant's pre-existing incapacities did not contnc-:'
to or "effect" the need of medical treatment or temporary tota;
disability caused by the industrial injury.

-5-

In the case at

t;r.

u1

ir1;
11

1

L

l'd worker

(Frederick J, Paulus)

sustained multiple

c" to both his shoulders and head from an industrial
.L

occurring on August 12, 1978 when his truck lost control,

,.,,,l:Jankment and flipped over
·.·.11

(R. 31),

The applicant was

l rom the vehicle and was pinned under the driving axle .

.. as Lnunediately taken to the Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital
'ar examination.
2

Following the event he was treated by Dr. Neal C.

cl and Dr. D. Ross McNaught in Cedar City, Utah for problems

- lath the

(R)

and

(L)

shoulders.

Due to the 1978 industrial

,. ec,t t!w applicant underwent surgery for his left shoulder in

·;01.·ember of 1978

(R. 210);

surgery on his right shoulder in

ccruary of 1979

(R. 211);

and then his left shoulder was re-

0

~rated

on in 1979.

There is no evidence in the record to show

:.-.3t the pre-existing conditions of the applicant's

back acted upon the

:o~

(L)

and

(R)

(L)

knee or

shoulder injuries to make them

S'l!.stant ially greater than they would have been otherwise.
Based upon the above 1978 industrial accident and the
.-:c~ies

sustained thereby, the compensation insurance carrier

~la.~t1ff

:•e

0

t11.~

State Insurance Fund)

paid compensation benefits for

his shoulder and head injuries.

Now the plaintiff

erroneously seeks reimbursement against the defendant on the
~r~unds

'~o~lder

that pursuant to Section 69 the industrial injuries (both
and head)

should be added in some "additive analysis"

-6-

with the pre-existing conditions

(left knee and low back) so

2

s

to require the Second Injury Fund to pay for 7/13th or 53.81.

cf

the medical costs and temporary disability benefits

,

incurre~

treating the injured worker's shoulder problems caused hy
industrial accident.

t~.

Such a contention is contrary to the ste:

and this Court's interpretation of what the statute requires.
Clearly, the statute requires a showing of how the prier
incapacitites have acted upon the current industrial injury :o
make the industrial impairment substantially greater than it
would have been "but for" the previous incapacity:

(1)
If any employee who has previously incurred a
perraanent incapacity .
. sustains an industrial in11·
. that results in permanent incapacity which is ·
substantially greater than he would have incurred if
he had not had the pre-existing incapacity, compensat::·
and medical care .
. shall be awarded on the basis c'
the combined injuries, but the liability of of the
employer for such compensation and medical care shaL :o
for the industrial injury only.
Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-69.
The plaintiff erroneously applies an additive analvsis
to the above statute to argue that the defendant ought to pay
7/13th of all the benefits flowing from the industrial injuEes.
Such an application is contrary to this Court's ruling
~,

supra, and Day's Market, supra.

in~

The plaintiff again

misinterprets the ruling in Kincheloe v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
of Ogden, 656 P. 2d 440

(Utah 1982)

to argue that the cause anc

effect is not important in showing how the industrial injun
resulted in a permanent incapacity which is substantially arc

-7-

it would have been "but for" the pre-existing condition.
The standard.announced.and applied in Ortega, is a
simple addit~ve analysis of the "substantially greater
requirement,
rather than a causal analysis. That is
unde~ Ortega, it is immaterial whether the pre-existi~g
condition causes the permanent incapacity resulting from
the industrial inJury to be greater than it otherwise
would be .
. This analysis was recently confirmed in
Kincheloe v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Ogden, 656 P.2d
440 (1982)
. Commenting on this point, the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
Under the reasoning of Capitano, the fact that the
1980 injury is unrelated to the 1974 injury is not
dispositive.
Irrespective of any causal connection,
the Second Injury Fund is to compensate one who
sustains "permanent incapacity which is substantially
greater than he would have incurred if he had not
had the pre-existing incapacity." 656 P.2d 442 (note
dropped, emphasis added).
Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant, Pages 7 & 8.
Kincheloe does not stand for such a proposition, nor does
it confirm it.

On the contrary, Kincheloe ruled that the employer's

.r,surance carrier was not entitled to rembursement because "it was
!casonable for the law judge to conclude that plaintiff did not
sustain "permanent incapacity which is substantially greater than
:~ ~ould have incurred if he had not had the pre-existing incapacity."
'J:cc~eloe held that the Second Injury Fund had no application

":h.ere the Commission made such a finding supported by substantial

e··16enco and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.
The plaintiff State Insurance Fund, the worker's compencation insurance carrier in this matter, continues to argue that
3

line of cases stand for an erroneous standard that the insurance

-8-

carriers ought to be reimbursed where the injured worker had
some form of pre-existing condition even though the prcv u'us
incapacity did not make the current industrial injury sut~st~.:."
greater than.

Such an argument is not supported by Utah case

ld,

The purpose of the statute was obviously to require a
"substantially greater than" test.

This test continues to recccLL

a "but for" analysis, see Day's Market, Inc.,

supra, OR a

"relationship or interrelationship" between the current industrio
injury and all the prior incapacities to show whether the

indus~:

incapacity is substantially greater than it would have been othe:wise.

Intermountain Health Care,

(Utah 1977).
610 P.2d 334

See also.

Inc. v. Ortega, SG2 P.2d 617

Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitanc,

(Utah 1980).

In Ortega this Court found a "relationship" between Ue
industrial pain problems and the pre-existing psychiatric impai:ment to rule that such an "increase" in the ind us tr ia 1 injury
satisfies the substantially greater test.

Capitano held that t'e

combined "effects" or the "interrelationsip" of both the previous
condition and the industrial injury entitled the applicant to a:
award on the theory that the shifting of weight from the currer:
injury of the right ankle to the prior Korean War injury of the
left leg established an "interrelationship" between the two in::.
to justify a finding that the previous injury adversely affectec
his industrial injury.
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In White v.

Industrial Commission, 604 P.2d 478

(Utah 1979)

~c•~ rourt set forth the method of apportioning liability in paying

<its once it was determined that the "substantially greater than"
1cJu1rement under Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-69 was met.
~c?hie

v. U.

S. Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 504

In

(Utah 1976), this Court

held that the defendant Second Injury Fund was responsible for a
share of the liability for a permanent injury which

~roportionate

could be ''partially attributable" to a pre-existing condition.
Regarding the apportionment of liability on death claims, the
Court ruled that the statute creating the Second Injury Fund,
rtah Code Ann., Section 35-1-68, does not allow for an apportion1'ent of liability or reir.ibursement on death claims. Pittsburgh
Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367

(Utah 1982).

The more recent cases have clearly required a showing of
"substantially greater than" in order to invoke liability against
t~~

defendant Second Injury Fund.

u. s.

F. & G. v.

Industrial Commission, supra, set forth

~e

elements of entitlement under Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-69

~sr

~re-existing

:r number:

1)

icr.dustrial)

conditions:

(previous)

injury .

"Basically, those conditions are three

incapacity . . . followed by
which is

3)

2)

subsequent

substantially greater than

that which would have been incurred had there been no pre-existing
~capacity.
b~ttling

_c

1.

Co.,

As the Court observed in Kincheloe v. Coca-Cola
supra, the fact that the prior injury is unrelated

,t dispositive.

However, the Second Injury Fund is to compensate

cr.l'.' one who sustains permanent incapacity which is substantially

srcater than he would have had otherwise.
-10-

The requirement of showing "substantially greater thac"
is clearly stated in the Kincheloe decision:
"Under the reasoning of Capitano, the fact that the
1980 injury is unrelated to the 1974 injury is not
dispositive.
Irrespective of any causal connection
the Second Injury Fund is to compensate one who sus~a'
"permanent incapacity which is substantially greaterthan he would have incurred if he had not had the preexisting incapacity.
The law judge's primary reason for disallowinc
compensation from the Second Injury Fund is, howeve;
proper reasoning for the ruling under the statute . . '
Emphasis Added.
Kincheloe v. Coca-Cola Bottling of Ogden, 656 P.2d 440

(Utah :ol:

Kincheloe further stated that where the Commission mal:ec
a specific finding that the cause of the applicant's need for
benefits was from the industrial injury and that the pre-existir:
condition did not make the industrial injury substantially grea:o
than it would have been "but for" the pre-existing condition, t'.'
Court should not upset such a finding where it is supported

~

substantial evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therEfrom.

Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Manfredi,

613 P.2d 888

(Utah 198c

In the case at bar, the Administrative Law Judge, actir.:
in behalf of the Utah Industrial Commission, made a specific Le..
that the pre-existing conditions
make the industrial injuries

(left knee and low back) did

(left and right shoulder and heaG

substantially greater than would have been otherwise:
"This was a very complicated case .
. All of the b
problems either pre-existed the 19 7 8 (ind us trial"
incident or were the result of a natural progress1
degenerative problem thereafter.
Since August 1~70
(date of industrial accident) was the only bonaf1cE
disabling industrial injury the progressive degenera
of the back thereafter, rated at 5%, cannot be the
basis of a recovery .
. As to the 5', impairment

-11-

back existing before August 1978 we have a more difficult
question.
The Administrative Law Judge finds that the
applicant cannot recover from the Second Injury fund for
the 5% impairment of the back as it existed prior to the
August 1978 injury for three reasons:
1.

2.

3.
The third reason that there can be no recovery for
the pre-existing impairment is the prohibition set
forth in the statute itself, Section 35-1-69, which
says that the industrial injury must "result in permanent incapacity which is substantially greater than he
would have incurred if he had not had the pre-existing
incapacity".
We cannot find in this case that the
industrial injury resulted in a substantially greater
permanent incapacity as a result of the pre-existing
condition when a completely different part of the body
is involved and the applicant at the time of the 1978
incident had no significant complaints or complication
with either his back or his knee . • . "
Emphasis Added.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 7,
inJ.

(R.

214, 215)

The law judge's findings above are supported by substantial
evidence and medical records:

(P.

201) .

(1)
There is not a medically demonstrable causal
connection between the low back problems complained
of and the industrial accident . . . There is no
evidence that any of the three accidents of 8-12-78,
March 1981 or July 1981 have had any demonstrable
lasting effects on his back condition.
Emphasis Added.

Based upon the substantial evidence and reasonable inferences

t" te drawn therefrom,

the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial

C~ITrission did not act arbitrarily or capriously in ruling that
tLe

industrial injury did not result in a substantially greater

in~apacity because of the pre-existing condition.

-12-

Consequently,

it was reasonble for the Administrative Law Judge to rule that
the plaintiff insurance carrier was not entitled to a 7/13 er
53.8% reimbursement from the defendant Second Injury Fund under
the provisions of Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-69.
In summary, the above stated statute and the cited Utah
case law specifically require a showing of "substantially greate'.'
before the employer or its insurance carrier is entitled to any
reimbursement against the Second Injury Fund.

The mere showing c'

a pre-exisiting impairment rating is not sufficient grounds to
require the defendant to reimburse the compensation insurance
carrier for benefits paid on an industrial accident.

This concL

is directly supported by an old Utah case that is seldom cited
the parties.

~

In Hafer' s Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 52.€ P.2d :·

(Utah 1974), the employer's insurance carrier

(State Insurance F,:·

argued that it was solely liable for 75% of the medical costs
compensation benefits awarded to the injured worker.

a~

The insura::·

carrier asserted that there was medical evidence to show that
injured worker had a prior disability which could fairly be

t~

rat~

at 25 per cent and it therefore relied on Section 35-1-69, U. c,:
1953, to argue that 25% of the applicant's benefits should be

awarded against Section 69.

Hafer' s Inc. held that the Commissic

did not act capriciously, arbitrarily or unreasonably, or in e~
of its authority in holding that the ind us trial injury complainc
was the sole cause of the applicant's disability and that the
compensation insurer was liable for the whole award, without ar,~

-13-

-~1rnbursement against the defendant Second Injury Fund,

pursuant

Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-69,

CONCLUSION

Veyo

Concrete Products, Inc. v. Second Injury Fund, the

~bove entitled matter,

represents a long list of cases appealed

to the Utah Supreme Court where the insurance carrier is seeking
re1ffibursement from the defendant on the basis that the claimants
~,ac: a

pre-existing "unrelated" impairment rating.

State Insurance

=un6 v. Second Injury Fund, Supreme Court No. 19694;
v. Muir, Supreme Court No. 19782;

Day's Market,

U. S. F. & G. v. Industrial

Commission, Supreme Court No. 19691; and Hall v. Second Injury Fund,
Supreme Court No. 19 34 5.
The Second Injury Fund petitioned the Court on a Writ of
Re\·iew to interpret the 1981 amendments to Section 35-1-69 regarding
a~ards

of Permanent Partial Disability to applicants on "unaggravated,

uuelated" pre-existing conditions and also, whether reimbursement

co the employer's insurance carrier should be based upon ratable
"~'pairments

of "unaggravated, unrelated" pre-existing body parts.

Second Injury Fund v. Streator Chevrolet and/or State Insurance Fund,
Supreme Court no. 19595.
The "substantially greater" requirement under the statute
as not altered or omitted by the 1981 or 1984 amendments,
=~iury

Second

Fund has been consistent in arguing that "before" any carrier

Ls on titled to reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund,

-14-

there must

be a showing under Section 35-1-69

(pre and post 1981 amendmer.t,

that the industrial incapacity resulted in a substantially <;tt~,
than incapacity than what the injured worker would have had if
did not have the previous incapacity.

Under Day's Market the :s

requires a "but for" analysis, not an additive one:
. this language requires a finding as to the effect
the pre-existing incapacity has upon the current incapacity.
Findings in the abstract as to the total preexisting are of little assistance in making this determination, since the full responsibility falls upon the
current employer (or insurer) unless it can be said t:i 6 the current incapacity is substantially greater than ttwould have been "but for" the pre-existing incapaci t~·."
Day's Market, Inc. v. Muir, 669 P.2d 440

(Utah 1983).

Based upon the requirements of the "substantially greater
under the statute and Utah case law, the plaintiff carrier

int~::

case is not entitled to a 7/13ths reimbursement against the Secc
Injury Fund.

Hafer's Inc. v.

(Utah 1974).

See also.

& G. v.

Industrial Commission,

Day's Market, Inc. v. Muir, supra;

Industrial Commission, supra;

Bottling Co. of Ogden,

526 P.2d 11'

supra.

C '

and Kincheloe v. Coca-co:e

Good sense would preclude

reimb~:-

carriers for benefits paid on injuries where the pre-existing
problems contributed nothing to said industrial injuries.
In the case at bar, the plaintiff carrier has simply fat_
to show how the pre-existing left knee and low back conditions
contributed to 53.8% of the benefits in treating the "right and
left shoulder" industrial injuries.

Hence,

the Second Injury

f ·

is only liable for benefits where the pre-existing incapacltv
the effect of substantially contributing to a portion of the Le
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f'G~ing

from the industrial injury.

By employing an additive

11:sis, the plaintiff confuses the requirement of the statute
_:1u1ng
dl~a~s

that under Section 69 the defendant Second Injury Fund
liable for a portion of medicals and compensation without

'bu_t for" analysis of how the previous incapacity made the
_:.dustrial injury "substantially greater."
The defendants respectfully request a ruling from the Court
:~at

the Second Injury Fund is only liable for benefits where the

~re-~xisting

incapacity has the effect of substantially contribut-

:J to a portion of the benefits caused by the current industrial

In other words, as this Court has stated previously in

·c,e

cited cases, the statute (pre and post 1981 amendments) requires

:cat the current industrial injury must result in a substantially
;reater impairment because of the pre-existing condition before any
is allowed.
DATED THIS

Gil-be.rt A. Martinez',
Administrator and Attorney of
Second Injury Fund
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing RESPONSE BRIEF was mailed, postage prepaid,
on the

i;/ ~

day of September, 1984, to the following

parties:

James R. Black
Attorney for the
State Insurance Fund
261 East 300 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Stephen W. Julien
Attorney for the Applicant
P. 0. Box 1538
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Second Injury Fund
P. O. Box 5800
Salt Lake City, Utah

84110-5800

